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Lavai théologique et philosophique, 46, 2 (juin 1990) 
THE PROPAEDEUTIC ROLE 
OF MUSIC AND LITERATURE 
IN LIBERAL EDUCATION 
Mary I. GEORGE 
RÉSUMÉ. — Les philosophes grecs anciens ont reconnu à la musique et à la 
littérature un rôle important non seulement dans la formation morale, mais aussi 
en vue d'une éducation proprement intellectuelle. Les reformulations successives 
des disciplines préparatoires à la philosophie ont graduellement perdu de vue au 
cours des siècles ce rôle plus intellectuel de la musique et de la littérature, avec 
comme résultat cette tradition des sept arts libéraux. Cet article revient à 
l'intégrité de la vision grecque en proposant trois manières dont la musique et la 
littérature contribuent à lapaideia, c'est-à-dire à une formation fondamentale en 
philosophie : 1) elles disposent à une appréciation du discours rationnel, quoiqu'à 
un niveau cognitifet non purement intellectuel; 2) elles procurent des exemples 
qui favorisent l'acquisition d'une connaissance fondamentale de la méthode des 
disciplines philosophiques ; 3) elles disposent l'appétit à une appréciation de 
choses proprement philosophiques. 
SUMMARY. — The ancient Greek philosophers recognized not only the influence of 
music and literature on proper moral development, but its impact on intellectual 
formation as well. This latter insight was gradually lost as the disciplines 
preparatory to a study of philosophy were reformulated through the ages, 
resulting in the tradition of the seven liberal arts. In this article we re-establish 
three ways in which music and literature contribute to paideia, i.e., to a basic 
philosophical formation, namely : 1) by disposing the student at a cognitive, 
though not purely intellectual level to an appreciation of rational discourse ; 2) by 
providing examples which aid the acquisition of a basic knowledge of method in 
the philosophical disciplines; 3) by disposing the student at the appetitive level 
for appreciating matters philosophical. 
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Homer, obtaining by fate a divine nature, built 
an ordered world of all kinds of verse. 
(Democritus, D/K21) 
I. THE PROPER ROLE OF MUSIC AND LITERATURE 
IN LIBERAL EDUCATION: A QUESTION RARELY RAISED 
T1 he purpose and place of music and literature among the liberal arts and in a liberal arts education is a question of no mean importance, not withstanding the 
almost universal neglect it has suffered. It has too often been the case that the 
proponents of the liberal arts (and we are taking that expression in its fullest 
traditional sense here) have been content to repeat the time-honored, if not time-worn, 
reasons for their study, just as they were also simply content to pass on under this title 
those disciplines which the platonic tradition, among others, had established, and 
which later received the names of the Trivium and the Quadrivium l. 
Such facile acceptance of the liberal arts tradition has resulted in a general neglect 
of any serious examination of classical Greek thought regarding music's educational 
value2. Literature's role in education is the object of similar neglect. Although never 
listed as one of the liberal arts, it was studied from ancient times up to the end of the 
Middle Ages under the title of grammar3. At the end of the Middle Ages, however, the 
interests of the grammarian shifted away from literature to more speculative consider-
ations. From this period on, grammar in a liberal arts context generally means 
speculative grammar4. Although literature eventually came back into vogue in the 
Renaissance, and to our day is considered an essential part of the Humanities, its place 
in a liberal arts program was no more an object of discussion than it had been before. 
Our principal concern here, however, is not whether music and literature are 
liberal arts, but rather whether they can contribute in an indirect way to the 
acquisition of the liberal disciplines. As will become clearer through our development 
of this question, it is entirely possible that literature and music, although not strictly 
speaking liberal disciplines, can nonetheless contribute to the formation of judgement 
in those disciplines. 
1. The seven liberal arts are arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy (referred to as the Quadrivium), 
and grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic (referred to as the Trivium). The ancient Greeks never spoke 
about the seven liberal arts in those terms. Cassiodorus (480-575 A,D.) is thought to be the first to have 
place any importance on their being seven (cf. Thomas DAVIDSON, Aristotle and the Ancient 
Educational Ideals [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1892], p. 245). From Plato's time on the 
actual subjects taught coincide more or less with these seven. In the Republic (525-531) Plato assigns 
arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy as studies to be undertaken by the guardians, before 
studying dialectic. These disciplines were originally advocated by the Pythagoreans (cf. Republic 530d). 
Grammar early on was recognized as a necessary element in education. Dialectic and rhetoric were 
generally considered higher studies, the latter partly due to Isocrates' influence. 
2. One notable exception is Mary SCHOEN, "Plato and Aristotle on the Ends of Music", Laval théologique 
et philosophique, Vol. XXXIV, n° 3, 1978. 
3. Cf. H.I. MARROU, A History of Education in Antiquity, Trans. George Lamb, (New York : The New 
American Library, 1956), pp. 124, 224-226. 
4. Cf. Paul ABELSON, The Seven Liberal Arts (New York: Russell&Russell, 1965), pp. 34 and 46. 
178 
THE PROPAEDEUTIC ROLE OF MUSIC... 
The first thing to be done, before beginning an investigation of this matter, is to 
make clear what we understand by certain key terms : liberal education, liberal art, 
paideia, propaedeutic. 
Since our purpose is not to address the more fundamental problems of liberal 
education and liberal arts, we shall content ourselves, as better suits this purpose, with 
defining them in a general way, more in keeping with accepted usage. 
A liberal education is one which aims at liberating the mind through knowledge 
of the highest truths. Such an education excludes studies which aim at utility, i.e., at 
putting order in things which exist outside the mind, rather than at perfecting the mind 
itself. A liberal art is a speculative or theoretical discipline which involves some kind of 
"making", but of a non-material kind, e.g., a geometrical construction, or a sentence, 
or an argument, and so forth. These so-called arts differ from the more advanced 
philosophical disciplines which are to supply the "meat" of a liberal education either in 
that they bear upon objects which are more proportionate, but less worth knowing in 
themselves (and thus less liberating of the mind), or in that they only provide the tools 
necessary for thought. And this is why the liberal arts are proposed as the initial 
disciplines in a program of liberal education5. 
In the case of paideia and propaedeutic we shall be obliged to give more precise 
and less generally known definitions. Indeed, in respect to these terms what is novel is 
not just the conclusions which we are proposing here, but the very questions 
themselves which we must first raise and which are rarely brought up. This ignorance 
of the appropriate questions stems from a lack of familiarity with a notion key to 
understanding the requirements of liberal education, namely, the notion of paideia. 
The word "paideia" comes from the word "rcaîç", "child". Its original meaning in 
ancient Greece was that of nourishing and caring for a child's physical needs. 
Eventually the word came to mean upbringing in the sense of moral education. And 
finally, in the period of the Sophists, it came to refer to intellectual formation. 
"Paideia", then, was a general word, more or less the equivalent of our word 
"education". Any of the numerous programs aiming at developing the student's mind, 
different as they might be, were all referred to as paideia. 
Views as to exactly what constituted an education varied greatly from educator to 
educator. One understanding of paideia, remarkable both by its profundity, and in a 
secondary way, by the fact that it keeps a certain tie with the etymological meaning of 
the word, is that elaborated by Aristotle. In his Metaphysics6, he points out the 
obvious fact that it is a mistake to pursue knowledge of a discipline before learning the 
method of that discipline, and he applies the term "paideia" to this knowledge of the 
5. Cf. Hugh of ST. VICTOR cited in Thomas von Aquin, In Librum Boethii de Trinitate Quaestiones 
Quinta et Sexta, ed. Paul Wyser (Fribourg: Société Philosophique, 1948), p. 27 : "However, amongst 
all these sciences, the ancients specially proposed seven in their own scholarly studies, in which 
disciplines they perceived there to be so much utility, ahead of all others, that whoever firmly acquired 
them would afterwards comes to a knowledge of the others more by inquiring and exercising than by 
hearing. For they are, as it were, certain pre-eminent instruments and rudiments by way of which the 
soul is prepared for the full knowledge of philosophical truth. These disciplines took the names of the 
trivium and the quadrivium, from the fact that by means of them, as by certain roads, so to say, the 
eager mind was introduced to the secrets of wisdom." 
6. 995al2. 
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method7. This notion is elaborated on in the Parts of Animals*, where he speaks of 
two ways in which one can be said to know a discipline : one consisting of a full and 
certain knowledge about the objects studied, and a second which he calls a certain 
"paideia". This "paideia" consists in the ability to judge whether an argument brought 
forth as proof is indeed the sort of argument valuable or pertinent in a given discipline, 
apart from any judgement as to whether the conclusion drawn is true or not. For 
instance, the person of paideia knows how "to look for p recision in each class of things 
just so far as the nature of the subject admits"9. The lack of such knowledge can be 
most serious, as would be the case, for instance, if one sought mathematical certitude 
in ethics. Since ethical matters do not admit of so much exactitude, one would easily 
fall into many errors, although not all the conclusions one drew would necessarily be 
false. An educated person, in this first aristotelian sense of the word, is able to 
recognize that the particular method being used is appropriate or defective, without 
for so much having anything to say about the validity of the conclusions drawn. 
Some examples will make it clearer what sort of judgements fall within the 
competence of the person possessing paideia. Suppose someone was to judge a 
particular doctor incompetent because, no matter what the illness, he always prescribed 
the same remedy. Such a judgement would require no professional knowledge of the 
appropriate cures for different diseases but could simply be based upon the general 
knowledge that different diseases call for different remedies. 
Another example can be found in the comparison of a novel with a film based 
upon it. It is a fairly common experience among those who have read and appreciated 
a good novel for what it is, to be very often much disappointed at the film made from 
it. The inverse could equally well be true, since the aptitudes of different literary forms 
(here, the novel and the film) for different themes is not the same. Unless some serious 
adaptations are made when passing from one form to the other, the result may be far 
from satisfactory. Now, the person who recognizes this fact is not for so much able to 
give a detailed and definitive analysis of a literary work, even though in possession of a 
principle which will allow him/her to make a first judgement of a work. 
We can well imagine that a person educated in literature (i.e., possessing paideia 
in literature) may judge that a particular sonnet is poor because it is lacking in 
metaphors, whereas a comic novel which also lacks them is not poor because of it10. 
7. 1094b24. 
8. 639a. Cf. also the Eudemian Ethics 1217a for another relatively developed passage on paideia. 
9. Nichomachean Ethics, 1094b25, hereafter referred to as N.E. Translation from The Basic Works of 
Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon [New York : Random House, 1968]. All other translations will be taken 
from this work unless otherwise indicated. 
10. In several of his works, the well known English scholar C.S. LEWIS tries to inculcate this kind of 
judgment in the reader of literature. For example in A Preface to Paradise Lost (London : Oxford 
University Press, 1967), pp. 1, 2, he points out that: "The misunderstanding of the genus (narrative 
poetry) I have learned from looking into used copies of our great narrative poems. In them you find 
often enough a number of not very remarkable lines underscored with pencil in the first two pages, and 
all the rest of the book virgin. It is easy to see what has happened. The unfortunate reader has set out 
expecting'good lines'— little ebullient patches of delight — such as he is accustomed to find in lyrics... 
after finding that the poem cannot really be read in this way, he has given it up. Of the continuity of a 
long narrative, of the subordination of the line to the paragraph... he has no conception." 
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Such a judgement is very telling, although it bears on the way a given content is 
presented, rather than on that content itself. In the realm of things intellectual, the 
educated person would, for instance, knows better than to "accept probable reasoning 
from a mathematician, [or] demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs". And he / she 
also knows which considerations are to be made first, and which subsequently, which 
are of primary importance and which of secondary n . 
The sort of judgment just exemplified is more superficial than that which can be 
made by a person who has mastered the subject matter of a discipline. Whence the 
appropriateness of denominating such knowledge "paideia", a word whose etymological 
meaning is child, or, in other words, someone imperfect in knowledge. The ability to 
make such a judgement is nonetheless a needed step in acquiring mastery of a 
discipline, for a sound judgement as to any matter presupposes that one use the proper 
methodology (even though one might fall upon the correct conclusion by chance). 
Paideia of method, then, must constitute part of the first knowledge a student is to 
acquire. The other kind of knowledge which Aristotle denominates "paideia" or 
"beginner's knowledge" is firm knowledge of a discipline's basic principles. Any 
mistake as to these and any subsequent proceeding will also lead to the truth only by 
chance n. 
In this article paideia is to be understood in the way which Aristotle understands 
it : as knowledge of the beginnings of a discipline, and especially of its method. A 
propaedeutic discipline, in this context, is one the contact with which facilitates the 
acquisition of knowledge of the method and principles of the liberal disciplines. A 
propaedeutic discipline may have a certain claim to liberalness in its own right, but it is 
not for this reason that it is considered propaedeutic. In fact, it is generally the case 
that the more liberal a discipline is, the less it admits of serving a propaedeutic 
function, if for no other reason than, generally being more difficult, it is less in the 
reach of a beginner. 
Before we address ourselves to the question of the propaedeutic value of music 
and literature, ambiguities concerning exactly what is covered by the terms "music" 
and "literature" remain to be cleared up. Also, in order to better situate our question it 
is helpful to consider very briefly some of the ways in which these disciplines have been 
thought to be liberal. 
11. Cf. Parts of Animals, 639al5 : "Thus it is clear that in the inquiry concerning nature there must be 
certain limits such that according to these the way of what is brought forward as proof makes it 
acceptable as proof apart from whether it is true or not. I mean, for instance, should we take each single 
species severally by turn... and define what we have to say about it, in and by itself; or should we first 
establish as our basis the attributes that are common to all of them because of some common character 
which they possess ?" (Translation mine) 
12. Cf. N.E., 1098b : "Now of first principles we see some by induction, some by perception... and others too 
in other ways. But each set of principles we must try to investigate in the natural way, and we must take 
pains to state them definitely... for the beginnings are thought to be more than half of the whole..." We 
will not insist upon paideia of principles because grasping the particular starting points of other 
disciplines is not aided in any manner by knowledge of music and literature. 
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1. Music as Liberal Art 
The study of music in the context of liberal education generally refers to one of 
two very different things. One is a theoretical study whose principal concern is 
analyzing the mathematical ratios of the notes forming the various harmonies. It has 
little or nothing to do with listening to music, but is an application of the mathematical 
discipline, arithmetic, to the physical reality, sound. This tradition originated with 
Protagoras and Plato, was reinforced by Boethius and has been handed down more or 
less unchanged as a liberal art ever since 13. Music, thus understood, liberates the 
mind, insofar as it is knowledge about the nature and properties of ordered sounds. 
The other meaning of music is more in the line of what we call music appreciation. 
It involves seeing a proportion between the development of a musical imitation of an 
emotion or emotions and those emotions themselves. As Aristotle points out, it is 
natural for human beings to be delighted by imitations, because this delight is founded 
upon our natural desire to know 14. Our minds delight in putting things together so as 
to see how they are related 15. To be able to perceive how the composer's use of a given 
instrument, key or rhythm at a given time represents a given emotion, or facet of an 
emotion, is a activity of reason in conformity with its discursive nature, and thus a free 
activity 16. Such an activity perfects reason itself in some way, as opposed to those 
activities which, although proceeding from reason, terminate in some action or 
product and are perfective of the will or of the product, rather than of reason itself. 
Such an enjoyment of music is what Aristotle is referring to when he says that : "our 
fathers admitted music into education, not on the ground either of its necessity or 
utility, for it is not necessary, nor indeed useful in the same manner as reading and 
writing... [t]here remains, then, the use of music for intellectual enjoyment in 
leisure."17 
2. Literature as liberal art 
During that period when literature was included as a liberal art under the title of 
grammar, it was nothing other than literary analysis. Literary analysis can refer to two 
different, if related, things : in one sense it refers to the discipline which teaches one in 
13. Cf. ABELSON, op. cit. 
14. Cf. Poetics, 1448b 15. 
15. Or, as St. Thomas AQUINAS states it: "all representations are delightful, and even those which are of 
things which in themselves are not delightful ; for the soul rejoices in relating one thing to another, for to 
put things together is reason's proper and connatural activity, as Aristotle says in the Poetics." (la-Hae 
Summa Theologia, q. 32, art. 8, corpus). 
16. This is the approach used by St. John's College. Cf. Statement of the St. John's Program 1982-1983 
(Annapolis, Santa Fe). We cite in part, p. 15 : "The work of the tutorial includes an investigation of 
rhythm in words as well as in notes, a thorough investigation of the diatonic system, a study of the ratios 
of musical intervals, and a consideration of melody, counterpoint and harmony. None of these is done 
apart from the sounding reality of good music." 
17. Politics, 1338al3. This is not to deny that sometimes "intellectual enjoyment in leisure" has another 
meaning, namely, a fitting relaxation from intellectual labor, entertainment which does not degrade the 
mind, but which is rather in keeping with the mind's natural motion. 
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general how to evaluate what poetic effect was aimed at, whether it was successfully 
brought about, and the means used to achieve it. In another sense it refers to the 
analyses of the particular works of literature themselves. And, finally, the study of 
literature may refer simply to familiarity with literary works, apart from any systematic 
effort at analysis. 
In order to evaluate the liberality of literary analysis, one must keep in mind the 
fact that literature, like the other fine arts, is a representation or imitation18. As is the 
case with all representations, there is the possibility of comparing the representation 
with the thing represented. Since such an act is natural to reason, and has no utilitarian 
end (relaxation aside), it is liberal. 
The liberalness of literary analysis is minimal, however ; which explains in part 
why it is so rarely talked about. For works of literature, (as is also the case for works of 
music), are artificial constructions : human products which could just as well have 
been other or not at all. Liberal education, on the other hand, consisting of knowledge 
which is as certain and as perfect as possible, must bear on what is necessary and 
eternal. The study of literature, then, although in keeping with reason's natural 
activity of putting things together, finally liberates the mind very little, since its object 
does not admit of universal and certain knowledge. For this same reason, music, too, 
is liberal to only the slightest degree. 
Must we therefore conclude that music and literature are not worth troubling 
over when there are so many other studies whose objects admit of certain knowledge ? 
The answer to this question will become clear as we discuss the propaedeutic functions 
these disciplines can serve. 
II. HOW MUSIC AND LITERATURE CAN CONTRIBUTE 
TO THE INITIAL FORMATION OF JUDGEMENT 
IN THE LIBERAL DISCIPLINES 
Music and literature contribute to the acquisition of paideia in the liberal 
disciplines in principally three ways : 1. by providing models of judgement useful for 
acquiring paideia in these liberal disciplines ; 2. by disposing the mind of the learner at 
a cognitive, but not purely intellectual level, for making intellectual judgements ; 3. by 
disposing the appetitive faculties of the learner in such a way that he/she can properly 
appreciate rational discourse. Let us consider each of these points in turn. 
1. The fine arts provide an aid to the acquisition 
of paideia in the liberal arts 
One of the first lessons to be learned in both music and literature is how to be able 
to determine the pleasure proper to each of the particular forms found in these arts. 
This is an obvious prerequisite to passing judgement on any particular work in a given 
18. More specifically, the particular object represented in literature is human action and character; in 
music, human emotion. 
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form. To seek the gayness and lightness of a waltz throughout an extended work such 
as a concerto, or to judge a symphony worthless because one cannot march to it, is to 
make an error in judgment belying a lack of paideia. To expect the unity proper to a 
tragedy in a comic novel, is equally to apply the wrong criteria. Aristotle insists on this 
point in the Poetics 19, and many other writers on the subject in subsequent centuries 
have followed suit20. Their common theme is that one must judge a thing for what it is, 
and not for what it was never meant to be. 
The proper judgement of anything requires first and foremost an understanding 
of the kind of thing it is an instance of, and what can be rightfully expected from that 
kind of thing, be it a certain use or a certain kind of knowledge. This latter knowledge 
is a principle of judgement having the broadest possible scope, and is the basis upon 
which other more detailed rules of judgement are elaborated. For instance, if a tragedy 
aims at a catharsis of pity and fear, it must also be plain that it cannot be written in a 
light, springy verse, nor can it exceed a certain length, for too many episodes dilute the 
tragic effect. 
Although it is not simple to learn such rules as will allow one to judge literature or 
music in the way we have described21, it is nonetheless true that we have greater facility 
in judging things artistic than in judging natural things (and a fortiori immaterial 
realities). As the authors of the works of art (or insofar as we have the same nature as 
their authors), we cannot find the same mystery in them as in natural things. For this 
reason, learning the basic rules of judgement in music and literature can serve as an aid 
for the even more difficult task of acquiring judgement in matters intellectual. This aid 
takes the form of providing more proportionate examples which will then serve as 
points of comparison22. For example, one who is aware that there are different 
standards of judgement for different literary works is prepared to expect that in like 
fashion, in the case of intellectual objects which are quite different from one another, 
there will doubtless also be different standards of judgement. So too, one who is aware 
that different themes in literature often require different literary forms will not need 
lengthy explanations in order to appreciate the fact that different philosophical 
matters require the use of different forms of logical argument. Or again, someone 
aware that one must first know what end a given musical form aims at, before one 
judges any particular example of it, will be more likely to insist upon an initial 
exposition of the end and kind of knowledge sought in a given liberal discipline. 
19. "[W]e must not demand of tragedy any and every kind of pleasure, but only that which is proper to it." 
{Poetics 1453b) 
20. We have already referred to C.S. LEWIS, who is certainly one of the most noteworthy modern authors to 
insist upon the importance of using appropriate criteria. Cf. op. cit. Cf. also, The Discarded Image, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964) and Spencer's Images of Life, Ed. Alastar Fowler, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967). 
21. Cf. N.E. 1181al8,"[A]s though judgment were not the greatest thing, as in matters of music. For while 
people experienced in any department judge rightly the works produced in it... the inexperienced must 
be content if they do not fail to see whether the work has been well or ill made — as in the case of 
painting." 
22. Note how in the beginning of this article paideia in literature was called upon to explain what paideia in 
general consists in. Cf. also Dorothy Sayers, "The Lost Tools of Learning", in A Matter of Eternity, ed. 
Rosamond Kent Sprague (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Willian B. Eerdmans, 1973), p. 114 for another 
example of paideia in the arts being used to shed light on paideia in the intellectual order. 
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This is no more than an application of the principle that one ought to teach 
method and cultivate judgement with regard to things more proportioned first, before 
going on to other things — milk before meat. Once paideia, or knowledge of the 
method which enables one to appreciate music and literature, is acquired, it can serve 
as a model from which we can more readily understand what paideia in the speculative 
disciplines involves. 
2. Music and literature foster reason's natural motion, 
before it is a question of presenting universal truths to it 
A second way in which knowledge of the fine arts contributes to the formation of 
the speculative intellect arises even before it is a question of our acquiring paideia in 
them. Simple familiarity with good works of music and literature disposes us in such a 
way that embarking upon speculative matters we tend spontaneously and quasi-
instinctively to look for certain things which ought to be found, if matters are properly 
presented. It is a well known fact that the ancient Greeks attached great importance to 
the notion that the young become predisposed to the good by being exposed to good 
art and music23. Somewhat less known is the fact that they also saw this exposure of 
the young to good art as a means of predisposing them to the true. This theme, if less 
developed in antiquity, is nonetheless clearly well founded. Consider what Plato says 
on these matters : 
And is it not for this reason, Glaucon, said I, that education in music is most 
sovereign, because more than anything else rhythm and harmony find their way 
to the inmost soul and take strongest hold upon it, bringing with them an 
imparting grace, if one is rightly trained, and otherwise the contrary? And 
further, because omissions and the failure of beauty in things badly made or 
grown would be most quickly perceived by one who was properly educated in 
music, and so, feeling distaste rightly, he would praise beautiful things and take 
delight in them and receive them into his soul to foster its growth and himself 
become beautiful and good. The ugly he would rightly disapprove of and hate 
while still young and yet unable to apprehend the reason, but when reason came 
the man thus nurtured would be the first to give her welcome, for by this affinity 
he would know her24. 
Although Plato does not distinguish here between moral and intellectual virtue, 
reflection on experience reveals that what he is saying about good music's beneficial 
influence does pertain to both. Consider, for example, the fact that beauty and order 
are found in both the fine arts and in the philosophical disciplines. In the philosophical 
disciplines, it is generally recognized that "it belongs to the wise to order", and that 
23. Note that this opinion is echoed in our day by Alan BLOOM, The Closing of the American Mind, (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 79: "[... bad music not only corrupts morals], [i]t ruins the 
imagination of young people and makes it difficult to have a passionate relationship to the art and 
thought that are the substance of liberal education." 
24. Republic 402a. All translations of Plato are taken from The Dialogues of Plato. Ed. Edith Hamilton 
and Huntington Cairns, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1966). 
185 
MARY I. GEORGE 
"the beautiful [is] the beginning... of the knowledge... of many things"25. And it is 
certainly a defensible position that "the chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry 
and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree"26. 
Notice, also, how often the words "unclear", and "beautiful" and, in ancient Greek, 
"àvapuoaxia" (inharmonious) are used with regard to intellectual matters. Thus, 
given that the realm of sensible things is that which is more known to us, and that it is 
through an understanding of this realm that we come to an understanding of things 
intellectual, it seems highly improbable that someone who lacked an idea of what 
constitutes clarity, beauty and harmony in the case of sensible things would have any 
facility in recognizing them in their analogical forms in things more abstract. 
A separate consideration of the two fine arts in question will bring out in greater 
detail how each fosters reason's natural motion. 
a) How music fosters reason's natural motion 
Someone who is familiar and fond of good music, and who knows what the 
sensible beauty of it consists in, will have less difficulty in loving and appreciating 
order and beauty which is not directly sensible than someone who does not have this 
appreciation. A person habituated to music which has no unity is poorly prepared to 
detect the difference between a discourse which is unified and one which consists of a 
series of more or less random comments strung together. When something foreign or 
irrelevant is introduced in a discourse, it is unlikely that such a person will have any 
sentiment of uneasiness. Moreover, a person not accustomed to music having a 
recognizable build-up to some definite climax will tend to fail to appreciate that an 
argument should consist of determinate premisses leading naturally to a conclusion, 
since a discourse is not only a whole, but a moving from the known to the unknown27. 
A fortiori, a person who does not even have a sense that something is wrong when 
faced with a disordered argument, will not have any intellectual ability to judge. 
The mode of understanding proper to human beings consists in going from one 
thing to another in a certain order. An appreciation of music does not simply require 
the sense of hearing, but also an ability to appreciate the order present in the sounds. 
And this is why even the higher animals cannot appreciate music fully. Now it is true 
that enjoying music, at least in the first instance, makes very little demand on reason : 
no abstract object is presented which would require an effort on the part of reason to 
be grasped. Nonetheless, reason is involved in music appreciation, and on account of 
this, exposure to music, be it good or bad, has an effect on reason. As Plato tells us : 
... animals at large have no perception of the order or disorder in these motions, 
no sense of what we call rhythm or melody. But in our case, the gods of whom we 
25. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, 1013a23. 
26. Ibid., 1078b. Mathematics, when not simply techniques for calculation, can be considered part of 
philosophy. 
27. This is one reason why music is a more suitable propaedeutic discipline than are the plastic arts which 
are essentially static. 
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spoke as giving us for companions in our revels have likewise given us the power 
to perceive and enjoy rhythm and melody28. And when [the young] have learned 
to play the lyre, [the masters] teach them the works of good poets of another sort, 
namely the lyrical, which they accompany on the lyre, familiarizing the minds of 
the children with the rhythms and melodies. By this means ithey become more 
civilized, more balanced, and better adjusted in themselves, arid so more capable 
in whatever they say or do, for rhythm and harmonious adjustment are essential 
to the whole of human life29. 
If there is reason to believe that good music fosters reason's ability to appreciate 
order, there is also evidence which indicates that bad music does just the opposite. For 
the fact that the disordered music listened to in our day accompanies an ever 
increasing inability for even the most basic reasoning does not seem to be a coincidence. 
Rock music, so popular among the young, has the very defects which we have just 
described. It often lacks a determinate beginning, middle, and end : just as it often 
simply fades out, instead of really ending, so too it often allows of being turned on and 
off at any point, as lacking a development of the sort which would call for a definite 
ending. This is in sharp contrast with both classical and folk music (the popular music 
of another time), where missing the last few measures leaves one with a distinct sense 
of disappointment. Good music has a determinate direction and goal, and its unity is 
such that absence of any of its parts is readily noticeable, and thus jarring30. 
One also might mention that the relative subtlety of the expression of emotions31 
in classical music generally escapes those who have been raised on music which is 
based on loudness, strong beat, marked discordance. If only but the most gross 
differences do not escape such individuals on the level of sense, there is little reason to 
hope that at the level of intellect they will be capable of making any fine distinctions. 
b) How literature fosters reason's natural motion 
In the case of literature, just as in the case of music, the simple familiarity with 
good works, prior even to any intellectual analysis of them, develops one's natural 
ability to appreciate order, whereas habituation to bad works destroys this ability. It is 
in fact easier to see this in the case of literature, since literature, inasmuch as it involves 
a discourse in words, bears a greater resemblance to liberal studies. The elements of 
literature which most resemble elements in the speculative order are attached to plot. 
Let us just look at what Aristotle considered to be the most general criteria which a 
plot would have to answer to if it were to be any good at all : 
28. Laws, II, 653d-654a. 
29. Protagoras, 326a,b. 
30. Cf. N.E.,\ 106b 10 : "[W]e often say of good works of art that it is not possible either to take away or to 
add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art, while the mean 
preserves it..." 
31. A very common opinion among young people is that classical music is "quiet" music. As a matter of fact 
classical music expresses the whole gamut of human emotions : heart-rending anguish, burning anger, 
passionate longing, and not just sanguine gaiety or other less intense emotions. 
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The unity of a Plot does not consist, as some suppose, in its having one man as its 
subject. An infinity of things befall that one man, some of which it is impossible to 
reduce to unity ; and in like manner there are many actions of one man which 
cannot be made to form one action... The truth is that, just as in the other 
imitative arts one imitation is always of one thing, so in poetry the story, as an 
imitation of action, must represent one action, as complete whole, with its several 
incidents so closely connected that the transposing or withdrawal of any one of 
them will disjoin and dislocate the whole. For that which makes no perceptible 
difference by its presence or absence is no real part of the whole32. 
The unity of a discipline, too, does not stem from simply bearing on the same 
subject. Nor is a discourse unified simply because the same words are repeated in 
successive sentences. In all the liberal arts, and in philosophy as a whole, there is a need 
to determine with great care the method or way by means of which a particular subject 
is approached, since the same subject can be looked at from many points of view. It is 
also necessary to avoid the use of words or phrases whose only principle of unity is 
their material identity, and not their cognitive content. Someone used to a random 
juxtaposition of sentences, more or less pertinent to a story, is not likely to find 
anything wrong with the same sort of thing when it occurs in a philosophical 
discourse. 
Moreover, we call a good plot "logical" when the conclusion does not "pop out of 
thin air", but follows as the normal or expected consequence of events having taken 
place earlier in the story. Such expectation does not, however, exclude any element of 
surprise in the outcome of a story — something which constitutes the specific pleasure 
of a mystery, for example — but only that such surprises as there are should find 
sufficient justification in the events related earlier in the story33. It is quite obvious to 
us that "the unravelling of the plot must arise out of the plot itself, it must not be 
brought about by deus ex machina"34. 
Now, "deus ex machina" is an expression which is used not only with regard to 
literature, but in philosophy as well. Its counterpart in philosophy consists in 
gratuitously assigning a cause in order to explain a given effect. For example, Aristotle 
blames Anaxagoras for using... 
... reason as a deus ex machina for the making of the world, and when he is at a 
loss to tell from what cause something necessarily is, then he drags reason in, but 
in all other cases ascribes events to anything rather than to reason35. 
And the expression has the same meaning in common usage today. 
A person who has acquired paideia in literature, and who thus recognizes that 
gratuitously introducing a cause to explain a given outcome makes for a poor story, 
32. Poetics 1451al6, a30. 
33. The same sort of thing is true in the portrayal of character, for if a character is well portrayed he should 
not act at one moment as if he were one character and another as if he were some other. 
34. Poetics, 1454b. 
35. Metaphysics, 985al8. 
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has a better chance of noticing a lack of connection between premisses and conclusion 
in philosophical reasoning than one who has not acquired this paideia, all other things 
being equal. 
The plot of a work of literature not only bears some resemblance to an argument 
in its movement from cause to result, it bears a further, and more specific, resemblance 
to a dialectical discussion : In both there is a setting out of a "problem", followed by a 
solution, which is the untying of the problematic knot established at the start. The 
beginning part of a good work of literature is generally a series of events delineating 
some problem from which the hero must escape (Couple falls in love. Couple's parents 
are violently opposed to their union...) ; and this corresponds to the setting up of a 
dialectical problem (The void would seem to exist, otherwise things would not have 
anywhere in which to move ; but then again some things are plainly seen to move by 
mutual displacement...). And in both literature and dialectic there is a dénouement or 
solution of the problem or problematical situation. Familiarity with good literature, 
then, would seem to dispose one to more readily appreciating a dialectical discussion : 
how a problem is set up, the movement from problem to solution. This disposition 
first takes the form of a feel or sense. And this sense gives one an advantage later on 
when one is formally taught about the elements of a dialectical discussion and their 
order : it will be as if one already knew them in some way ; they will not seem strange36. 
If lack of familiarity with good literature is to be lamented, even more so is 
habitual contact with bad literature, that is, bad in the sense that it lacks unity and 
expresses only the random meanderings of unguided imagination. Such works, 
lacking beginning, middle and end, can be read starting anywhere (and often are). A 
steady diet of such works cannot be consumed without detriment to one's natural 
ability to recognize order, especially in things of the mind. To Socrates' question, "are 
we on the way to or from the finish line", the student raised on such literature is likely 
to answer, "What difference does it make?"37 
In our day watching television is an additional factor contributing greatly to the 
development of certain habits detrimental to the intellectual life. It is not an uncommon 
practice to come in half-way through a program, watch a bit, and then switch to some 
other program during the commercials, never watching a single program all the way 
through to the end, but simply regarding whatever seems most amusing at the 
36. Cf. PLATO, Phaedrus 263dff for an excellent example of someone who could have drawn profit from an 
exposure to good literature. We cite in part : 
Do you find any cogent reason for his next remark, or indeed any of his remarks, occupying the 
place it does? ... 
[Phaedrus :] You flatter me in supposing that I am competent to see into his mind with all that 
accuracy. 
[Socrates :] Well, there is one point at least which I think you will admit, namely that any 
discourse ought to be constructed like a living creature, with its own body, as it were ; it must not 
lack either head or feet ; it must have a middle and extremities so composed as to suit each other 
and the whole work. 
Then ask yourself whether that is or is not the case with your friend's speech. You will find that it 
is just like the epitaph said to have been carved on the tomb of Midas the Phrygian... [I]t makes 
no difference what order the lines come in. 
37. Cf. N.E. 1095a30. 
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moment. No one plot — that is, no rational sequence in which there is some principle 
unifying the events which take place — is followed out to its logical conclusion ; rather 
there is but a random juxtaposition of images. Moreover, certain programs never even 
rise to the level of having a plot to speak of, and some have formats which in fact 
intentionally avoid plot, relying on sensorial stimulation to keep their audience. In 
such a context, it is hardly surprising that the inability of students to recognize the 
meanings of words such as "therefore" or "consequently" is so common a teacher's 
lament. Perhaps a better diet of literature, films and television programs would curtail 
their tendencies to intersperse words at random in a written text without any regard 
for their logical or semantic import. 
Moreover, those television programs which require no mental effort to follow, 
either because they are of a purely factual nature or because they present no rational 
problems, or because they are based on a logic which seems to affirm that a sequence 
of events is sufficiently justified by the fact that one event follows another in time, must 
also share the responsibility for students' inability to get interested in a problem. So 
often their only reaction to an effort to present a problem, with its pro's and con's, is to 
grow impatient, and to ask for the answer. 
And inasmuch as music touches us at a younger age, and more directly than 
literature ("Nothing moves the soul like song"38), exposure to bad music will be much 
more harmful than lack of familiarity with good music. To pervert the natural 
tendency to appreciate order in music thus affects the young person even more 
profoundly than perverting this tendency with regard to literature. Plainly, with 
regard to both, if it is a beneficial thing to cultivate the natural appreciation for order, 
it is more important to prevent its perversion. 
3. Good music and literature 
disposes the appetitive faculties of the learner 
in such a way that he/she can properly appreciate rational discourse 
a) Music's propaedeutic role on the part of the appetite 
Music disposes not only the mind of the student to liberal learning, but the 
appetitive faculties as well. Music is one thing without practical utility which we 
readily appreciate; it is "naturally sweet to us"39. Thus, it fosters appreciation for 
liberal knowledge by providing an introduction to the joys of knowledge desirable for 
its own sake and not for any utilitarian end. Such an introduction is especially 
necessary in our age, where the prevalent mentality would reject the pursuit of such 
knowledge because it is useless. 
In our age of mass production and disposable goods, it is not hard to understand 
why people fail to recognize that anything non-functional could be desirable (crafts-
manship is not economical, and, after all, plastic furniture is much more practical 
38. "Nihil immutat animam sicut cantus." St. Thomas, cited by Fi. Jasmin BOULAY in « Le rôle de la 
musique dans l'éducation», Laval théologique et philosophique, Vol. XVII, 1961, n° 2, p. 270. 
39. Pol. 1340M7. 
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when it comes to cleaning). However, even in those times and places where people are 
more contemplative by temperament and custom, the very difficulty of intellectual 
matters can make them turn away from disinterested knowledge : After all, "learning 
is painful"40. Whence all can profit from having their appetite whet for these things, 
and music is especially apt for doing this : "The study [of music] is suited to the stage of 
youth, for young persons will not, if they can help, endure anything which is not 
sweetened by pleasure, and music has natural sweetness."41 Once we have tasted the 
more refined pleasure of something going above the purely sensible, we are more likely 
to pursue other pleasures of this sort, even in the face of attendant difficulties. 
b) Literature's propaedeutic role on the part of the appetite 
Although no other fine art appeals so spontaneously to us as does music, our 
appreciation of literature, too, is quite natural. A sign of this can be found in the love 
most children have for stories. Thus, familiarity with literature also tends to make us 
conscious of the fact that utility is not the absolute measure of worth, and that some 
things are desirable in themselves. 
A second role which literature plays with regard to disposing the appetites to 
speculative learning is it "teaches us how to wonder"42. This observation of St. Albert 
appears to be in the same vein as the well known remark Aristotle makes when 
discussing wonder's role as a first principle of philosophy : "Even the lover of myths is 
in a sense a lover of Wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders."43 
Wonder is the beginning of philosophy on the part of the appetite. It is 
consequently of critical importance that it not be stifled, but fostered. However, one 
might question whether that wonder which is the source of philosophy and that which 
belongs to the poetic arts are not in some important ways different and fundamentally 
opposed. Contrary to what St. Albert says 44, children who wonder at a story — about 
how the elephant got its trunk, for instance — do not go on to seek any more 
philosophical explanation of the matter, but rather delight in hearing the same 
fictional explanation over and over again. In other words, they seem to want to stay in 
this state of wonder. 
The philosopher, on the other hand, does not want to stay in this state of wonder. 
Rather, wonder is a goad which stimulates the philosopher to discovering the cause 
responsible for what initially amazed him, which, when discovered, will extinguish 
wonder45. 
40. Politics, 1339a28. 
41. Ibid, 1340b 17. 
42. Literally : "gives us the mode in which we should wonder", ("dat modum admirandi"). St. Albert the 
Great, Metaphysica, in Opera omnia, ed. Berhardo Geyer (In Aedibus Aschendorff : Monasterium 
Westfalorum, 1960), p. 23. 
43. Metaphysics, 982b 17. 
44. St. Albert, ibid., "The poet makes up a story to arouse wonder, and the wonder in turn arouses the 
desire for inquiry, and this is what philosophy consists of." 
45. Cf. Metaphysics, 983a 17. 
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The question of the nature and relation of philosophical wonder and poetic 
wonder are matters of some subtlety, and it would take us too far for our principal 
purpose to embark on a treatment of them here. We will limit our remarks to the 
observation that philosophical wonder is rarely found in an individual who lacks 
poetical wonder of the sort which is aroused by an intriguing plot. Witness the fact that 
most of the great philosophers had some interest in literature. Moreover, children who 
are bored by stories often suffer from a general disinterest in solving problems, 
especially of the philosophical kind which seek the relations of cause and effect. A 
child who is jaded when it comes to things that he/she ought to naturally delight in is 
not likely to take interest in intellectual matters which so often go beyond even adult 
capacities. Thus, it seems probable that if one has never experienced wonder in regard 
to literature, one will not be able to wonder readily about the more difficult matters of 
philosophy. 
III. CONCLUSION 
1. Music and literature's three propaedeutic roles 
It should be clear now that although music and literature have very little 
liberating effect upon the mind, it is nonetheless worthwhile familiarizing oneself with 
them, if only on account of the very valuable propaedeutic functions which they serve. 
Certainly one could argue that music and literature provide other benefits to the 
development of a well-rounded person : purgation of emotion, relaxation befitting a 
human being, etc. However, our particular concern has been to show their more 
immediate contribution to the intellect's ability to freely contemplate the highest 
truths which is via the propaedeutic functions which they serve. 
We have seen that the role which music and literature play in providing models 
for the paideia of the speculative disciplines is of considerable value. For without 
paideia in at least one of these disciplines, the possibility of readily grasping what 
paideia is in speculative science is substantially diminished. Though it is possible for 
someone to be disposed by nature in such a way that he/ she readily acquires elements 
of paideia by observing things which are not products of human art, (certain people 
have a feel for certain disciplines), still, discoveries made by an individual in virtue of a 
natural gift suffer from being incomplete. We see, then, that one advantage of a 
systematic acquisition of paideia in some fine art is that it provides a more complete 
model for paideia in speculative matters. A better mind undoubtedly will be able to get 
by with less paideia in the fine arts. In the case of certain individuals, familiarity with 
one of the fine arts might suffice. A background in music, for example, might make up 
for a deficiency in literature. However, there is an advantage to familiarity with a 
variety of such arts, since this protects the mind against a habituation to one art which 
might impede one's ability to appreciate the others. Plainly one should avoid 
specializing, as, for instance, in something like epic poetry, while neglecting music and 
the visual arts, and even the other parts of poetry. 
To reiterate some of the particular advantages of possessing paideia in the said 
disciplines : The person who sees that even within an art there are differences in the 
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objects treated is less likely to confuse two different arts with one another. The one 
who realizes that in art the good artist takes care to use the appropriate instrument of 
the variety at his disposal is less likely to be surprised that in philosophy, too, care 
must be taken as to the use of the various logical tools. And the one who sees that a 
literary form like the novel is limited to the expression of determinate effects and ends 
is less likely to expect that some other work in words should be capable of just any 
effect whatsoever. He will not, for example, expect an emotional uplifting from a 
philosophical treatise, nor argumentation from a work of literature. Clearly, then, for 
the greater well-being of one's intellectual life, one should acquire paideia in some fine 
art for which one has aptitude and interest, and preferably in several. 
As for encouraging reason's natural appreciation of order, familiarity with music 
and literature, while not indispensable to the philosophical disciplines, certainly 
contributes to their well being. It is also true, however, that some individuals naturally 
have more sensitivity for order and beauty than do others. And where natural 
deficiencies exist (such as being tone-deaf), generally little can be done about them. 
Whatever aptitude for music or literature one has, however, should be reinforced by 
good habit, so that later, in matters intellectual, one will welcome what is orderly and 
reasonable like a friend. 
We must not forget that far more important than being familiar with good art, is 
being preserved from habitual contact with bad art. For though the person who simply 
lacks contact with good art, lacks a first stimulation of the mind towards recognizing 
order and proceeding in an orderly way, still his/her capacity for these things remains 
intact. Repeated exposure to bad art, on the other hand, results in a habituation to 
disorder which supplants reason's natural capacity to appreciate order. When such 
habits take root at a very early age, reason generally becomes a permanent slave, being 
indeed dominated to such a point that it does not even recognize that it is enslaved. 
We might note that the ability to judge a fine art, as an intellectual capacity and a 
form of paideia itself, is more like the paideia of the speculative disciplines than is the 
simple familiarity with good art. But simple familiarity with good art, and above all 
avoidance of habituation to bad art, while more remote from speculative paideia, are 
more fundamental to its acquisition. Without the right exposure to the fine arts, one's 
chances of ever acquiring paideia (much less science) are slim. 
As far as the appetite is concerned, music 46 and literature are helpful for giving us 
an appreciation for things gratuitous, especially in the face of the utilitarian bent of 
our age. However, they are not absolutely necessary. And to poetry can be assigned 
the additional role of first stimulating our wonder about problems. 
46. Note that we have not been talking about the liberal art of music which consists in measuring and 
compounding ratios of a thing of limited being, namely, sound. Certainly, as a speculative discipline, it 
is one which is more easily acquired since it bears on something sensible. However, its study does not 
seem to offer any particular advantage for acquiring paideia. Certainly it does not predispose the mind 
to order more than does the learning of the mathematical sciences themselves. And it is at the very least 
dubious that its method, one involving measuring and calculation, provides a model for acquiring the 
mode of proceeding proper to other speculative disciplines. Any benefit such a study might have for 
one's intellectual formation as a whole is much more limited than that to be obtained from music as we 
have been treating it. 
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2. Ars longa, tempusfugit 
Even if we grant that music and literature are of great propaedeutic value, one 
might still wonder if they are worth devoting so much of our precious time to — time 
which might perhaps seem better spent on the more truly liberal disciplines. 
Yet when one thinks about it, familiarization with good music and literature is 
something that should begin in the home, during childhood. Children take a natural 
interest in these things. Some explanation, at least in the case of music, can be given to 
young children, showing them that music is a representation, and how different 
instruments are used (à la Peter and the Wolf), as well as what different rhythms and 
scales there are, and how they may be employed to different effects. Literary 
appreciation is a bit more subtle a matter, and is best introduced later on, but it is 
hardly a discipline to be reserved for the university level. In fact, if children are 
gradually exposed to different literary genres, as they grow old enough to appreciate 
them, through good-quality representative works of each, the development of their 
critical faculties will be an easy matter. 
It takes no detailed observation of children to see that long before reason is fully 
awakened, the inner sense powers are active. These powers participate in reason, and 
are necessary foundations for it. The development of these lower faculties cannot be 
overlooked in the name of addressing the highest faculty, without prejudicing reason's 
development. Forcing a child to skip the natural steps in his intellectual development 
is destined to have the same effect as forcing a plant to flower : namely, unnatural lack 
of resistance to disease and premature death. 
Certainly children are also particularly well disposed for learning facts. Their 
memories are exceptionally retentive because all seems new and wonderful to them. 
Yet however important the acquisition of factual knowledge may be, we must bear in 
mind that it does not, in and of itself, foster reason's ability to go from the known to 
the unknown. A surfeit of facts can even stifle this ability. The very randomness of the 
information fact books contain, however useful, leads to the well-known habit of 
leafing through such collections, since they imply no intellectual order between the 
different facts, and thus require no effort on the part of the reader to tie one thing to 
another. We may readily go from the number of marsupials in Tasmania to the birth 
date of Napoleon, to the satellites of Jupiter — no one of these facts requires a 
previous knowledge of all those preceding it in the book, nor, especially, any reasoning 
from the previous knowledge47. 
A good story, on the other hand, does demand an effort on the part of the child to 
see how the events recounted hang together to form a whole. From this point of view, 
47. We do not mean to say, of course, that no book of facts has any order, or that previous parts are never 
necessary to the understanding of the later ones. In an historical narrative, for example, the previous 
events may alone allow us to understand the following ones. Even here, however, fiction is more orderly 
than fact, and many an historian has been strongly tempted to go beyond the data to what "must" have 
happened (or, perhaps, to what "should" have happened.) The relation between pure facts seldom 
leaves much room for the development of a rational order. 
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good stories have a irreplaceable role to play in education, and make more suitable 
reading for the young than do non-fictional works. 
The aspect of wonder is also not to be neglected. A child, or young person, pushed 
precociously into philosophy, risks being motivated by the desire to be more clever 
than others, rather than by wonder. Uncorrected, such a motivation will lead him/her 
away from true wisdom. Nature requires the development of the lower faculties, 
before the higher. Poetic wonder, which involves more the imagination than reason, 
seems to be intended as a stepping-stone to intellectual wonder. 
Of course one does not want to raise a child on music and literature alone, lest he/ 
she become habituated to their mode to the point that it becomes an impediment to the 
appreciation of any other form of discourse48. As Newman justly remarks, those 
whose education has consisted principally in literary studies tend to lack a sense of 
rigor and of critical judgement49. 
Our answer, then, to the problem of lack of time for music and literature is that 
there is no reason that they not be studied when one is young, and not yet ready for 
more difficult studies anyway. Without pretending to give any definitive program for 
approaching these two fine arts, it seems fairly safe to give certain general guidelines : 
simple familiarity with these arts can start from childhood; a more conscious 
awareness of the imitative nature of music can be introduced very soon after ; literary 
appreciation can be started in grade school, and studied more intensively in high 
school (especially when one considers how high school curricula often consist of little 
other than purely utilitarian courses, spiced with a few frivolous électives). Although 
appreciation of these arts should gradually leave more and more space for the serious 
disciplines as one grows older, at least one reason for a continued interest in them 
should be plain : We continue to need the lessons in paideia which they can provide us 
with, such as the continual reminder that we must not seek mathematical certitude 
everywhere which the study of literature will always furnish us with. 
48. As Aristotle points out in the Metaphysics (995a) : "The effect which lectures produce on a hearer 
depends on his habits ; for we demand the language we are accustomed to, and that which is different 
from this seems... unintelligible... Thus some people do not listen to a speaker unless he speaks 
mathematically... while others expect him to cite a poet as witness." 
49. Cf. John Henry NEWMAN, in Nature of University, (London and Toronto : E.P. Dutton & Co., 1928), 
pp. 155, 156. 
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